COMMENTS
LABOR AGREEMENTS-IMPLIED LIMITATIONS
ON PLANT REMOVAL AND RELOCATION
THE LEGALITY of removing a firm's plant and equipment was un-

likely to be challenged a decade ago, absent a clause in the employer's collective bargaining agreement specifically prohibiting such
action. Within recent years, however, labor unions have frequently
urged arbitrators and courts1 to find substantial implied restrictions,
as a matter of contract law, on the right of a firm unilaterally to
remove its plant facilities and operations.
Historically, interpretation of labor agreements was guided by
the "reserved rights" theory which held that management retains all
rights and functions relating to the operations of the enterprise ex-

cept as specifically limited by the collective bargaining agreement.
This view now finds little support in the removal cases, 2 and paralleling its demise has been the ascendancy of the "implied limitations" theory.3 This theory originated in arbitration cases involving
subcontracting,4 where it became well established that inter-company
work movements may be restricted by implied terms in the labor
agreement. In view of their substantial victories in this field, it
I The scope of judicial review of labor arbitration awards is not a subject of this
comment. These court decisions considered herein arise when there is no provision
for arbitration in the collective bargaining agreement.
2The quiescence of the reserved rights theory in removal cases is apparently
paralleled in the subcontracting area. Dash, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes, in Symposium: Management Rights and Labor Arbitration, 16 IND. & LAB. REL.
Rav. 208, 214 (1963); Greenbaum, The Arbitration of Subcontracting Disputes: An
Addendum, 16 IND. & LAB. R.L. REv. 221, 229 (1963). See, however, the discussion of
the Stetson case, note 36 infra.
8
Subcontracting is engaging an outside organization to manufacture products or
perform services which could be manufactured or performed by the firm's own bargaining unit employees using the firm's own facilities.
'See Dash, supra note 2; Greenbaum, supra note 2.
5 Although the implied limitations theory is chiefly a tool of labor, management has
attempted to utilize the same type of reasoning. In American Mach. & Foundry Co.,
16 Lab. Arb. 95 (1950), the company claimed that despite an explicit provision dedaring that removal would not alter the bargaining unit, the union had not objected
to transfers beyond the jurisdiction of the unit in the past. The arbitrator held, however, that the union was not bound by its prior acquiescence and that the words of
the agreement must control. Id. at 96-97. Compare text accompanying notes 69-72
infra.
The Supreme Court, moreover, while recognizing the validity of finding implied
terms in labor agreements, made no attempt to restrict that practice to findings in
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was not unexpected that unions should attempt to utilize the implied
limitations theory to protect their members from economic loss due
to plant transfer or removal. 6
This comment considers the law relating to implied limitations
on plant removal in two basic fact situations: (1) where it is alleged
that removal is itself a breach of contract; and (2) where the union
has asserted rights vis-4-vis the employer at the new site of operations
after removal has been accomplished." Although it is only in the
latter situations that union success has been substantial, the implied
limitations theory has become increasingly important in both areas,
and future decisions favorable to the unions can reasonably be
expected.
REMOvAL AS A BREACH OF THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Construction of the Contract
A. Recognition clause.
Unions have argued with some success that the recognition
clause s bars a firm from subcontracting work normally performed by
bargaining unit employees. 9 It is reasoned that the recognition
favor of labor when it sanctioned an extension of the arbitrator's source of law to
extra-contractual factors. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363

U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
4From the point of view of employers, one "difficulty with the implied limitations
theory is that it proves too much.... [I]t applies with equal logic to every area of
management conduct." Lindau, Comment, 16 IND. & Lan.
IA..
RF
v. 215, 217 (1963).
The cases considered herein are not limited to those in which the firm's entire
operations have been removed. Not treated, however, are cases clearly involving
breach of express terms of the contract. See, e.g., Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co.,
162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (S. Ct. 1936); Jack Meilman, 34 Lab. Arb. 771
(1960).
The question of whether and to what extent a firm is obligated to negotiate
with the union concerning removal or relocation is beyond the scope of this comment. See Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 Dum
L.J. 1; Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over the "Unwritten" Terms and Conditions
of Employment, 36 TExAs L. Rxv. 863 (1958); Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain
About Subcontracting and Other "Management" Decisions, 64 CoLUm. L. Rav. 294
(1964).
8
The recognition clause is a declaration that the employer recognizes the union
to be the exclusive representative of the employees covered by the contract for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
QE.g., A. D. Julliard Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 713 (1953). The recognition clause has
been held to bar work movements of other kinds, such as the allocation of union
work to non-union supervisors. Lear, Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 681 (1953); cf. Joseph S.
Finch & Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 883 (1963). On the other hand, there are numerous
awards holding that the recognition clause does not prevent the employer from
subcontracting. E.g., Celotex Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 554 (1963); Black-Clawson Co.,
34 Lab. Arb. 215 (1960).
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clause is intended not merely to designate or specify the bargaining
unit, but that it also implies a promise that the size of that unit will
not be reduced by management's unilateral decision to remove work
customarily performed within the unit. In two removal cases, this
contention has been dismissed without discussion. 10 In another
case, however, the arbitrator stated that the recognition clause was
evidence which, although not in itself conclusive, tended to show
that a prohibition on removal was intended.1
B. Work protection clause.
Selb Mfg. Co.'2 is the only case in which a clause prohibiting
subcontracting was relied upon by the arbitrator in characterizing
removal as a breach of contract. 13 It is noteworthy that in a number
of other cases, work protection clauses far broader in scope than the
one in Selb have been held not to prohibit removal. In Linde Co.,' 4
for example, the contract provided that
employees outside of the bargaining unit will not perform such
work as is customarily performed by the employees in the bargaining unit to the extent that the earning opportunity of the latter
group is affected adversely [except in case of emergency]. 1r
The award noted that the transfer giving rise to the grievance was
motivated by pressing economic considerations, and that the evidence
indicated that the clause was originally inserted as a result of the employer's allocation of unit work to supervisory employees. While
recognizing that the clause related to situations other than supervisory personnel doing unit work, the arbitration board held that it

10 Linde

Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1073 (1963); Celanese Corp. of America, 23 Lab. Arb.

685 (1954).

" Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 5

(1964). See text accompanying footnotes

51-53 infra; cf. Safeway Stores, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 357 (1964). But see Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 807 (1962), involving a grievance arising from the transfer
of hauling operations from one division covered by the contract in issue to another
division of the company covered by a contract with a different union. In denying
-the grievance the arbitrator stated that "each provision in a labor agreement is
always, subject to limitation by other provisions. . . . If strong and rather remote
implications are to be read into the Recognition provisions would not consistency
require that implications also be read into the Management Rights provision." Id.
at 811.
1-37 Lab. Axb. 834 (1961), enforced, 49 L.R.R.M. 2366 (E.D. Mo. 1961), afl'd, 305
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1964).
2' Compare text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
', 40 Lab. Arb. 1073 (1963).

"1Id. at 1075.
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could not "remotely be interpreted" to deprive the company of the
power to build and utilize plants at new locations.16
In UAW, Local 408 v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co.'7 the union
sought to enjoin contemplated removal for the duration of the contract, relying on a work protection clause which provided that any
manufacturing to be performed by the company during the contract
term should not be performed "in any other plant in which any officials or owners of this company have an interest.' 8 Elsewhere,
however, the agreement provided that the employer should have "the
right to decide the number and location of plants," and that if the
company should move its plant or operations, the contract should remain in effect.' 9 The court invoked the canon of construction that
all terms of a contract must, if possible, be given effect; it found for
the employer, reasoning that if the union should prevail, the provision giving the company the right to determine the number and
location of plants would be transgressed, and the clause providing for
the continued effectiveness of the contract in case of removal would
be rendered superfluous. The court's employment of this canon of
construction seems to be of dubious propriety, however, because it
20
appears to render the work protection clause meaningless.
C. Management rights clause.
The effect to be given a management rights clause has been
expressly at issue in relatively few removal cases. As previously
"Old. at 1078.

1746 L.R.R.M. 3015 (E.D. Mich. 1960).

at 3017.
The relevant section of the contract was construed in UAW v. Crescent Brass
& Pin Co., 46 L.R.R.M. 2975 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
20 See text accompanying note 18 supra. No explanation was made as to what
effect the decision gave to the work protection clause. The court did, however, note
that the contract "used the words 'In any other plant.'" Id. at 3017. Perhaps, therefore, the decision is to be read as holding that the plant to be built at the new
location would be the same plant as the one at the old location. See Oddie v. Ross
Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961), rev'd, 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1962), where it was asserted that a plant remains the same plant wherever it is
moved. If this was not the court's holding in Crescent Brass & Pin, however, then
the use of the canon of construction invoked appears impossible.
Compare Automobile Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 22 L.R.R.M. 2344 (E.D. Mich.
1953); Metal Textile Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964); United States Steel Corp., 36
Lab. Arb. 940 (1961); Facile Corp., 18 Lab. Arb. 781 (1952). The United States Steel
case held that a clause requiring the maintenance of local working conditions does
not, "in the absence of some clear and unequivocal agreement on the subject,"
preclude the employer from performing given types of work at one plant rather than
another. 36 Lab. Arb. at 941.
18Id.
10
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noted, the clause was construed to permit transfer of operations in
the Crescent Brass & Pin case, 21 despite the existence of an ostensibly
conflicting work protection clause. In Celanese Corp. of America,22
the arbitrator stated that the decision to transfer "relates to 'management of the plant' and 'direction of the working force and plant
operations',"3 functions expressly reserved to the company in the
management rights clause. In addition, it was noted that the decision to remove seemed to be authorized by two other provisions, one
giving the company the right to furlough employees if production
was temporarily not necessary at the plant designated in the contract,
the other defining "management" as including the right to lay off or
recall employees in connection with any reduction or increase in
the working force.24
Except for these two cases, management rights clauses have had
little significance in the resolution of disputes over removal.2 A
possible explanation of this fact may be that such provisions are
often too general to be of assistance in applying the contract to the
facts of the dispute.28 A proponent of the "management" view has
stated that his idea of a "good clause" would be as follows: "All
functions not limited by this agreement, and then only to the extent
limited, are retained exclusively by the company." 27 But another
commentator has noted that in some industries the chances of such
an agreement being adopted would be indeed slim.2 8 The give and
take of the bargaining process may thus preclude the utilization of
21 See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
2223
28

Lab. Anb. 685 (1954).
1d. at 687.

24Ibid. The arbitrator's decision was buttressed by evidence in the bargaining
history tending to show that the management rights clause had been inserted in the
contract to cover contingencies such as subcontracting and removal. However, the
arbitrator noted that the clauses referred to did not give the company absolute
freedom of action; good faith on the company's part was held to be "of prime
consideration." Id. at 690.
2 In Automobile Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 32 L.R.R.M. 2344 (E.D. Mich. 1953)
and Linde Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1073 (1963) the presence of a management rights clause
-was cited as one reason for the decision in favor of the employer; the weight accorded
these clauses, however, was apparently slight.
"Lack of specificity seems to have occasioned the statement of the arbitrator in
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., quoted in note 11 supra.
• Doolan, Reserved Rights in Labor Arbitration: A Management View, N.Y.U.
211, 213 (1959).
28 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999,
1010 (1955). Due to the recent acceptance of the implied limitations theory, moreover,
unions would probably be more reluctant now than in 1955 to accept any contractual
recognition of the reserved rights theory.
12-rH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
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a device which at first glance would seem to provide a means of
clarifying the intent of the parties.
D. Other clauses.
Occasional union contentions that implied limitations on removal follow from the existence of certain other contractual clauses
have met with little success. Thus, the argument that a collective
bargaining contract of a stated duration carries with it an implied
promise by the employer that employment will not be reduced during the term of the contract has been rejected in several cases. 29
Similarly, no removal case has held that the description of job classifications imports a guarantee that those jobs shall always be filled,80
although a contrary result has been reached in some subcontracting
cases. 31
In enforcing the Selb arbitration award, 32 the district court stated
perfunctorily that the existence of the seniority provisions would
alone have sufficed to sustain the award. 33 The court apparently
believed that a seniority provision not only entitles employees to
seniority rights, but also empowers them to demand that they enjoy
those rights exclusively at the plant designated in the contract. This
view seems unfounded and has been rejected by two other federal
34

courts.

E. The entire contract.
Rather than relying on a particular contract term to block
removal, a union may assert that its agreement is "instinct with an
20Fraser v. Magic Chef-Food Giant Mkts., Inc., 324 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1963);
Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab. Axb. 449 (1962); John B. Stetson Co., 28 Lab. Arb.
514 (1957).
"Johns Manville Fiber Glass, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 620 (1961); Weyerhaeuser Co.,
37 Lab. Arb. 308 (1961). But see Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 353 (1964), wherein it was suggested that job description and classification clauses might prohibit
removal if there were some affirmative evidence, such as in the parties' practice or
bargaining history, that the parties intended those clauses to have such an effect. Id.
at 357.
8"Continental Can Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 67 (1956); Parke, Davis & Co., 15 Lab. Arb.

111 (1950).
82See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra, and text accompanying notes 54-55
infra.
" IAM v. Seib Mfg. Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2366, 2368 (E.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd, 805 F.2d
177 (8th Cir. 1962).
31Auto Workers v. Federal Pac. Co., 36 L.R.R.M. 2357, 2358 (D. Conn. 1955);
Automobile Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 32 L.R.R.M. 2344 (E.D. Mich. 1958). But
see Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 358 (1964), wherein it was suggested that the
existence of seniority provisions might prohibit removal if there were some affirmative evidence that the parties intended those provisions to have such an effect. Id.
at 357.
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obligation" on the employer's part to take no action which will
frustrate the agreement's basic purposes.8 5 From labor's point of
view, one basic purpose of collective bargaining contracts is to ensure
employment opportunity and security. Clearly, that purpose is
frustrated even by removal motivated solely by economic considerations. The legitimate purposes of management, however, may be
frustrated by the inability to transfer its operations. Hence recognition that a contract is "instinct with an obligation" does not necessarily compel a decision for the union. Moreover, obligations which
might be encompassed by the "instinct obligation" doctrine can be
modified by express terms in the contract. Thus, in the two removal cases in which the doctrine was explicitly recognized the
arbitrator did not feel bound to hold for the union.8 0
F. Omission.
That intent may be inferred from what is omitted from a contract, as well as from what is included, is scarcely novel reasoning.
Only in Automobile Workers v. Ford Motor Co.. 7 however, was the
omission of a clause prohibiting removal expressly held to be conclusive proof that such-a prohibition was not intended. 8 A number
of arbitration cases have considered omission as some evidence,
inconclusive in itself, that a proscription on removal was not intended.3 9
"-A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with
an obligation,' imperfectly expressed ..
" Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (Cardozo, J.).
88 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 807 (1962); Celanese Corp. of America,
23 Lab. Arb. 685 (1954).
John B. Stetson Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 514 (1957), is a case in which the arbitrator
purported not to be persuaded by the argument that the contract was instinct with
an obligation to preserve its subject matter. The arbitrator stated that "the authority
of the Company to make business decisions is limited only as the agreement expressly limits it. This is the settled law of collective bargaining agreements." Id. at
517. Nevertheless, the arbitrator directed the company to provide a fund for severance
pay and moving expenses, to employ at the new location all former employees, and
to distribute accrued pension funds and grant accrued vacation benefits, apparently
for the sole reason that he considered the company's unilateral decision to remove
-to be "unwise" and "morally wrong." Id. at 517-19.
'1 32 L.R.R.M. 2344 (E.D. Mich. 1935).
88
in the Automobile Workers case it was stated that inclusion of an express
prohibition on removal would have been a simple matter and hence failure to do so
in an otherwise comprehensive agreement must mean that it was not intended. The
court noted that the employees "do not claim that their bargaining representatives
were so naive and inexperienced as to have suffered the ... [company] to talk them
out of including such a condition in the contract on the grounds that it was unnecessary to have it in there." Id. at 2351.
"ICurtiss-Wright Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 5 (1964); Linde Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1073, 1079
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Extra-contractualFactors
A. Past practice and bargaining history.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan has observed that
Words in a collective bargaining agreement, rightly viewed by
the Court to be the charter instrument of a system of industrial
selfgovernment, like words in a statute, are to be understood only
by reference to the background which gave rise to their inclusion.40
It is accordingly accepted by courts and arbitrators that a reliable
indication of intent may often be found in evidence of both the past
practice of the parties and the bargaining history, not only of the
contract being construed, but also of prior contracts.
In Metal Textile Corp.'1 for example, a provision purporting to
prohibit "letting out" of either maintenance or production work
where the effect would be "either to reduce the normal work week
...or

to cause a layoff"' '

was held not to preclude removal of a line

of the company's production from New Jersey to Mississippi. The
arbitrator noted that the term "let out" was definitive neither within
the firm nor throughout the industry. He found that inclusion of
the disputed provision twelve years earlier had been motivated by
concern over the possibility of subcontracting maintenance work,
and that there was no evidence that such removal as had here occurred had been contemplated by the parties. Moreover, developments subsequent to insertion of the clause tended to support this
conclusion. For example, when a move had been rumored in 1958
the union had asked only to discuss severance pay and had not in43
voked the clause now in issue.
The interpretative technique of inquiring into past practice and
bargaining history has inured greatly to the benefit of employers. 44
(1963); United States Steel Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 940, 941 (1961); Celanese Corp. of
America, 23 Lab. Arb. 685, 687 (1954).
,United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (concurring
opinion).
"42 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964).
,2Id. at 108.

at 109-10.
"Other cases in which bargaining history was considered include Safeway Stores,
Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 353, 355 (1964); Linde Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1073, 1078 (1963);
Celanese Corp. of America, 23 Lab. Arb. 685, 689 (1954); Facile Corp., 18 Lab. Arb.
781, 783-84 (1952). Past practice of the parties was examined in Safeway Stores, Inc.,
supra at 354, 356; Air Prods. & Chems., Inc:, 39 Lab. Arb. 807 (1962); Weyerhaeuser
Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 308, 312-13 (1961); Celanese Corp. of America, supra at 688. Decision
in every case was for the employer.
13Id.
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That the constructions urged by the unions have often appeared
somewhat novel no doubt accounts in large measure for this fact; but
as the implied limitations theory gains increasing recognition in
other areas, past practice and bargaining history may be expected to
weigh more heavily in labor's favor.4 5
B. Employer's motive.
According to two recent studies, in only fifteen of one hundred
and fifteen cases considered did the arbitrator, in deciding whether
or not subcontracting constituted a violation of the labor contract,
fail to inquire as to whether the decision was made in good faith,
whether it was dictated by reasons of economic efficiency, or whether
it was unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory or intended to harm
or undermine the union.4 6 The same considerations have been
deemed important in removal cases.
In Celanese Corp. of America4 7 other factors were accorded far
more extensive treatment, 4s but good faith was held to be "of prime
consideration" in upholding the company's decision to remove. Similarly, while other considerations helped shape the decision in Linde
Co., 49 the arbitrator emphasized that there was no anti-union purpose, that management flexibility, was a necessity under the circumstances, and that to sustain the grievance would seriously have
jeopardized the company's competitive position. 50
,5 Thus, ten years ago an arbitrator might have had little difficulty in finding
that a recognition clause implied no limitation on removal. Now, however, the
question has been raised frequently enough so that most if not all labor and
management negotiators are aware of the limitations that a recognition clause may
imply, and it may be impossible to say that neither side, in renegotiating an agree.
ment, considered the cause to imply such a limitation.
"ISee Dash, supra note 2, at 210, 212-13; Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 224-25.
Greenbaum's conclusion was that, absent an express contractual provision, "arbitrators
will decide an employer may contract out as a management function . . . provided
the employer has made a reasonable business decision in good faith without intent
to undermine the union. .. . The matter boils down to how arbitrators interpret
the phrases 'a reasonable business decision,' 'good faith,' and 'intent to undermine.'"
Id. at 234. It would seem more likely that the "reasonableness" of the business decision
-is merely evidence of an intent or lack of intent to harm or undermine the union,
than that labor agreements are construed to contain an implied term that union
employees cannot be made to suffer by a decision which is unreasonable purely from
a business point of view.
"123 Lab. Arb. 685 (1954).
118The arbitrator cited past practice, bargaining history, the scope of the manage.
ment rights provisions, and the lack of any express limitation as reasons favoring
the company's position. Id. at 687-88. See notes 21-45 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 25, 44, and text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
"40 Lab. Arb. 1073, 1077-78 (1963).
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In Curtiss-Wright Corp.51 the union contended that "the fundamental principle of contract law is that hardship, economic or otherwise, is not a sufficient excuse for the failure to comply with the
terms of an agreement." 2 With evident impatience, the arbitrator
noted that fundamental differences between a labor agreement and
an ordinary single-transaction contract can preclude application of
the same rules of construction to both kinds of agreements. A labor
contract "must be construed, interpreted and applied with due consideration of its purposes and objectives," 53 and where the failure
to remove plant facilities would probably entail failure of the business, such a move could not violate the contract.
In Selb Mfg. Co., removal was held to violate a clause which
ostensibly barred only subcontracting. However, it may be significant that following its apparently unique assertion that the "clear
language" 54 of the subcontracting clause prohibited removal, the
board further stated
[W]e believe a Company may discontinue in whole or in part a
totally unprofitable operation; we do not believe that a Company
may avoid an agreement or any part thereof by moving such
operations [merely] in order to increase the degree of profitability.
If this could be done, such clauses or agreements would mean
very little. 5
Although the employer's motive has frequently been a subject of
inquiry in removal cases, it is difficult to generalize with respect to
its significance. It is clear that a decision to remove which was
motivated solely to destroy the union constitutes an unfair labor
practice. 58 The decisions, however, are amenable to diverse interpretation because of the flexibility of such criteria as "good faith"
or "valid economic motives."' 5
5143 Lab. Arb. 5 (1964).
2
1 Id. at 7.
53 ibid.

5' 37 Lab. Arb. at 843.
3Ibid. (Emphasis added.) But cf. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 807,
811 (1962) where it was held that "in transfer of work cases a little more consideration is given . . . to management's needs for efficient operation."
88
Assuming that an anti-union motive were so established, the employer would
have violated § 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibits discrimination
against employees with regard to hire or tenure. Labor-Management Relations Act
§ 8 (a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1958). See, e.g., NLRB v. Preston
Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346, 350, 352 (4th Cir. 1962); Goetz, The Duty to Bargain

About Changes in Operations, 1964 DuKE L.J. 1, 2-3.
57For other cases in which the employer's motive was considered, see Plywood
Workers Union v. International Paper Co., 46 L.R.R.M. 2859 (D. Ore. 1960); Safe-
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SURVIVAL OF CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CONTRACT RIGHTS AFTER REMOVAL
A firm which succeeds in removing its operations without being
held to violate its collective bargaining agreement may nevertheless
find itself under continuing obligations implied from the agreement.
Unions in a number of cases have successfully asserted that irrespective of the legality of the move itself, rights defined by the agreement survive removal. 8
Constructionof the Contract
A. Recognition and description clauses.
A substantial number of courts and arbitrators have considered
whether recognition or description clauses"9 import a geographical
limitation on the efficacy of the contract. A recital in the agreement
in Zdanok v. Glidden Co.6 that it was made "for and on behalf of
its plant facilities located at [street and city address]"61 was held to be
mere descriptio personae, and the company's contention that this
recital prevented the contract from conferring enforceable rights
upon the employees at any location other than the one named therein
was overruled.6 2 However, in Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co.63 the
court construed a contract in which the company recognized the
union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in its plant or
plants which are located in that portion of the greater Detroit
way Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 353, 357 (1964); Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab. Arb.
449,5 8455-56 (1962); Facile Corp., 18 Lab. Arb. 781, 784 (1952).
Seniority rights, specifically the right to recall, are most frequently at issue in
cases of this kind.
The recognition clause is normally accompanied by a phrase or sentence, herein
called the description clause, setting forth the location of the plant where the members of the bargaining unit are employed at the time the agreement is entered into.
s0288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), af'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 530 (1961). The
decision reversed the district court, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441 (SD.N.Y.
1960), and was considered by the Supreme Court only with regard to the issue of
whether participation by a judge of the Court of Claims would compel reversing
the court of appeals decision.
61288 F.2d at 103.
" The court stated that the employees had "'earned' their valuable unemployment insurance, [seniority rights] and that their rights in it were 'vested' and could
not be unilaterally annulled." Ibid. For analyzes of the concept of vested seniority
rights, compare Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. Rnv. 505 (1963) (favorable), with Aaron, Reflections on the
Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 1532 (1962)
(critical).
3305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962). The decision
reversed Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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area within the city limits of Detroit for the purpose of collective
bargaining....6
The union's argument that this language was merely a reference to
where the company was then located was rejected.6 5 The court distinguished Zdanok on the ground that in that case there was "a
specific reference to one plant only, the address of which was
specifically given, and there was no specific geographical limitation
such as is contained in the agreement in the present case." 66
Most arbitrators who have considered the question have avoided
attempts to discriminate on the basis of subtle differences in word67
ing, but rather have simply disagreed with one another. Without
specifically stating that a recognition or description clause imports
no geographical restriction, several other cases have held that a labor
contract may have effect elsewhere than at the situs named therein 6 8
B. Management rights clause.
The typical management rights clause by its terms imposes no
limitation on the survival of union employee rights. In fact, in
Lion Match Co.6 9 a management rights clause was held to imply
that union rights were intended to survive relocation. A part of the
clause expressly provided that the company should have the exclusive right to determine the location of the plant and equipment.
The arbitrator reasoned that if the possibility of removal had not
been contemplated there would have been no need for such a man0,805

F.2d at 147.
eThe union's position, said the court, "ignores the fact that the reference is
not to the employees of the . . . Company but to the Company's employees 'in its
plant or plants' within the city limits of Detroit. . . . The fact that the beneficiaries
of the contract are specifically designated as the employees in all of the Company's
plants within the city limits of Detroit instead of merely the employees of the . . .
Company in Detroit makes it plain that the words were not used for the purpose
of merely giving the present location of the... Company." Id. at 149.
eIbid. The distinction seems specious because the issue of whether there was a
"specific geographical limitation" was the very issue considered in both the Zdanok and
Oddie cases.
" For cases supporting the union's position, see Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb.
353 (1964); Lion Match Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1 (1963). For cases supporting management's view, see Phillips Chem. Co., 89 Lab. Arb. 82 (1962); United Packers, Inc.,
38 Lab. Arb. 619 (1962). In H. H. Robertson Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962), it was
held that the circumstances under which the contract was negotiated constituted
some evidence that a geographical restriction was intended.
08 Metal Polishers Union v. Viking Equip. Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1960);
Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 203 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Mich. 1962); American
Mach. & Foundry Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 95 (1950).
1-40 Lab. Arb. 1 (1963).
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agement rights provision. Having decided that the possibility of
removal was clearly contemplated, the arbitrator held that if termination of the contract was intended in the event that removal was
accomplished, it would have been logical to so provide. Absent a
provision to that effect, it was assumed that the parties intended
that the contract remain effective at the new location."
C. Seniority clause.
The unique case of H. H. Robertson Co. 7 1 arose when the company removed a small part of its equipment from a plant in Pennsylvania to a new plant in California. Prior to this move the company
had more than one plant. Seniority rights in the plant in which
the grievance arose were described in the contract as to length of
service within the plant, department, or position. The arbitrator
held that the contract's structuring of seniority rights on a plantwide rather than a firm-wide basis was evidence that these rights
were intended to exist only at the Pennsylvania location.7 2
Extra-contractualFactors
A. Commingling of work.
When an employer transfers operations to already existing facilities, resulting practical problems may prevent the agreement from
governing work at the new location. In Safeway Stores, Inc. 78 the
grievants were laid off when the office machines which they operated
were transferred to another established plant. The machines were
there used to perform additional work as well as that previously
done by the grievants. The arbitrator found that the work which
had previously been the responsibility of the grievants had become
inextricably commingled with other functions, and that since the
"Old. at 5. Lion should be a disturbing case to employers who feel that, by virtue
of having expressly gained or reserved the exclusive power to determine the location
of plants, they have freedom to seek through plant removal more skilled or, perhaps,
cheaper labor. Employers, therefore, might find the following to be a more plausible
view of the Lion agreement: since the union would have no reason to object to a
plant transfer which caused the union no detriment, it would be superfluous to
provide in the contract that management might initiate such a non-detrimental move.
Thus, the provision must be intended to give the employer the right to remove even
though such action causes harm to the union.
37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962).
72Id. at 932. The arbitrator also held that the clause describing the location of
the plant implied a geographical limitation of the effectiveness of the contract. Ibid.
1- 42 Lab. Arb. 353 (1964).
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work no longer existed as a separate entity, it could not be restored
to the bargaining unit.74
Phillips Chem.

Co. 75

arose when an employee was laid off pur-

suant to the company's plan to centralize its business machine operations by consolidating into a single unit the work of nine. The
grievant, a member of one of the nine old units, sought to follow
the work under the seniority provision of the labor contract. In
finding for the employer, the arbitrator held that the work transferred to the center could not be said to belong only to the unit of
which the grievant was a member, but rather to all nine units,
and to none of them individually on a pro rata basis. Each of the
nine units had been covered by a separate collective bargaining contract. Since amalgamation of all these contracts to produce a single
hierarchy of seniority was deemed impossible, the grievant was held
76
to possess no surviving seniority rights.
B. Geographical distance of the move.
Basing their arguments on the recognition and description
clauses, courts and arbitrators have disagreed on the issue of whether
operation of the collective bargaining agreement is geographically
restricted.7 7 In every such case the tribunals purported to be seeking the intent of the parties. It is noteworthy, however, that of the
eight cases stating that the ordinary description clause imports no
geographical restriction,7" only one involved a move to a location
more than one hundred miles from the original plant site.79 In six
of the remaining seven cases the move was a local one, 0 and in none
7'Id. at 356-57. Compare Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 449 (1962), in
which employees were held not entitled to rehiring according to their seniority when
the company moved its facilities from one plant to two others covered by contracts
with unions other than the one representing the grievants. Id. at 462.
7 39 Lab. Arb. 82 (1962).
'Old. at 84; cf. Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 208 F. Supp. 50, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1962),
aff'd, 316 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897 (1963).
77 See text accompanying notes 58-68 supra.
7
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961); Metal Polishers Union v.
Viking Equip. Corp., 278 F.2d 142 (1960); Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 208 F. Supp.
50 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 316 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897
(1963); Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 203 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Mich. 1962);
Safeway Stores, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 353 (1964); Lion Match Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1 (1963);
International Harvester Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 332 (1955); American Mach. & Foundry
Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 95 (1950).
79
In the Johnson case, supra note 78, the move was from Wyandott, Michigan to
Peoria, Illinois.
"0In Zdanok, supra note 78, the only case among these seven in which the move
was clearly not a local one, the firm moved from Elmhurst, Long Island to Bethlehem,

Pennsylvania.
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was work or equipment transferred out of a well-defined trading
area. On the other hand, of the six cases finding a geographical
restriction, four of the removals were of great distance and to
separate geographic-economic areas.8 1 Moreover, in the two cases
not involving long-distance moves there were other weighty reasons
for holding in favor of the employer.8 2 Since few of the decisions
refer specificaly to the distance of the move, the significance of
these facts is necessarily conjectural.8 3 It would be consistent with
the decisions, however, to conclude that the distance of the transfer
is a compelling decisional factor. Courts and arbitrators may believe
that as a general rule a labor agreement will remain effective following removal, but only if the removal is not of great distance. Such
a belief may represent merely an adverse reaction to the assertion
that a contract created to govern relationships in one area should
be effective at a place far removed from that area. On the other
hand, it may be felt that a reasonable compromise between the
competing demands of employer and employees would consist in
enforcement of the latter's claim to the right to recall if the move is
not beyond commuting distance.8 4
CONCLUSION

This study unearths no consistent decisional pattern. The law
surrounding plant removal consists of divergent and often irreconcilable holdings accepting, rejecting, or qualifying assertions of implied limitations on the rights of firms to remove their facilities.
There is no certain answer as to whether a recognition clause implies
81
Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., -05 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962) (move from
Detroit to Tennessee); Bradley v. Sangamo Elec. Co., 51 L.R.R.M. 2375 (Il1. Cir. Ct.
1962) (move from Illinois to South Carolina), vacating Bradley v. Sangamo Elec. Co.,
50 L.R.R.M. 2828 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1962); Phillips Chem. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 82 (1962);
Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 449 (1962); United Packers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb.
619 (1962) (move from Chicago to Louisiana); H. H. Robertson Co., 37 Lab. Arb.
928 (1962) (move from Pennsylvania to California).
82These cases were Siv'yer Steel Casting Co. and Phillips Chem. Co. where commingling of the grievants' work with work in preexisting facilities was held to limit
-the right to recall. See note 74 supra and text accompanying notes 75-76
as But see Zdanok v. Glidden Co., wherein the court stated that few would seriously argue that "if the plant moved from 94th Street to 93rd Street in Elmhurst, an
entire structure of legal rights would tumble down." 288 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1961).
The move in Zdanok was from Elmhurst, Long Island to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
a distance of about I00 miles.
a&The cases, as shown above, are not absolutely consistent with this analysis.
However, to the extent that the analysis is valid, the ostensible attempt to determine
the parties' intent as to the geographical efficacy of the agreement would seem to be
merely ritualistic obeisance to a traditional canon of contract construction.
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a promise that the work of the bargaining unit will not be reduced;
nor is it clear that if the clause sets forth the plant's location, the
necessary implication is that the rights and duties created by the
contract can exist only at that location; another open question is
whether a firm may relocate a plant only if it is operating in the
red but not if it is making a large or even a meagre profit.
An explanation of this apparent lack of consistency may be that
orthodox rules of contract construction are inadequate to resolve
questions arising under collective bargaining agreements s5 A collective bargaining agreement is, in a very real sense, not a voluntary
one; the parties must agree with one another, for they have no one
else with whom to deal. Failure of a particular firm and a particular
union to come to terms entails frustration of the objectives of both
parties. Thus, if one party places upon some term or clause a construction which it knows the other does not or will not willingly
accept, the choice is not simply between failing to insist upon that
construction and finding a different party with whom to deal; the
alternative to the withdrawal of one party's proffered construction
may be costly deadlock. Consequently,
the pressure to reach agreement is so great that the parties are
often willing to contract although each knows that the other places
a different meaning upon the words and they share only the common intent to postpone the issue and take a gamble upon an
arbitrator's ruling if decision is required 8 8
This fact indicates not only the necessity for recognition of implied terms in labor contracts but also the inadequacy of traditional
canons of contract construction. In theory, contract interpretation
is a matter of finding the manifest intent of the parties. However,
the exigencies of the collective bargaining process may well induce
a party to a labor contract not to make his intent manifest; 7 hence
tribunals are not infrequently called upon to construe contract
clauses which are reasonably susceptible of clearly contradictory
interpretation. Were a court or arbitrator in such a case merely to
state that according to the rules of contract construction there is
no discernable intent, hence no agreement, and that the issue must
85 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HEaRV. L. RLT. 1482 (1959);
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1
(1958); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv.
999 (1955).

80 Cox, Reflection Upon Labor Arbitration, supra note 85 at 1491.
'8 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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therefore be negotiated, the parties would be subjected to precisely
the risks they may have sought by silence to avoid. The parties may
simply not desire that the court or arbitrator seek out intent. It
may be, rather, that "in the last analysis, what is sought is a wise
judgment. It is judgment, said Holmes, that the world pays for."8 8
Viewed in the light of the collective bargaining situation, then,
seemingly inconsistent holdings relating to implied restrictions on
plant removal need not cause alarm. If the parties to collective
bargaining agreements have in fact intrusted to arbitrators and
courts the resolution of conflicts which are too costly for them to
resolve by themselves, then there will be cause for concern only if
one or both parties lose confidence in the tribunals. 9
"Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, supra note 85, at 1016.
But cf. Doolan, Reserved Rights in Labor Arbitration: A Management View, N.Y.U.
12H ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LAoR 211, 222-23: "Generally, employers are prone to
insist on tight contract language. They are not prone to provide a field day for the
loose contructionist."
"' There has been at least some criticism from each side as to the extent to which
the implied limitations theory has been accepted. Compare Fairweather, Implied
Restrictions on Work Movements-The Pernicious Crow of Labor Contract Construction, 38 NOTRE DAMm LAw. 518 (1963), with Vladeck, Comment, 16 IND. & LAB. REL.

Rav. 218 (1963). This may indicate a healthier state of affairs than would the existence of one-sided criticism accompanied by one-sided satisfaction.

